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Ending Patent Exceptionalism and
Structuring the Rule of Reason: The
Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both
Robin Feldman*
In a wonderfully crisp manner, Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion in the recent case of FTC v. Actavis, Inc. sets out the
issue in the case:
[T]wo companies settle under terms that require . . . the claimed
infringer[ ] not to produce the patented product until the patent’s
term expires, and . . . the patentee[ ] to pay [the infringer] many
millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to
pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this
kind of settlement agreement is often called a “reverse payment”
settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such
an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition
in violation of the antitrust laws.1

The simplicity of the description is particularly impressive
given that very little in the context of patent litigation between
generic and branded pharmaceutical companies is crisp or
clear.
The litigation and regulatory system for launching generic
drugs is called Hatch-Waxman,2 after the legislation that
spawned its web-like complexity.3 And herein lies the problem;
© 2014 Robin Feldman
* Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Innovation Law at
the University of California Hastings College of the Law. I wish to thank Scott
Hemphill and Matthew Avery for their kind comments on prior drafts. I also
wish to thank Joseph Bleckman and Joshua Wolf for their excellent research
assistance.
1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
2. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
3. For a detailed description of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
machinations it has engendered, see C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay:
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1553, 1578–79 (2006) (describing the 180-day exclusivity duopoly that
can be granted to generic firms under the Act); Matthew Avery, Note,
Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders
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the complexity of Hatch-Waxman has provided opportunities
for patent manipulation. These opportunities appear against a
backdrop of the patent system in general, in which
manipulation of the patent system has been elevated to an art
form.4
The difference between our aspirations for the patent
system and what we are currently experiencing can be summed
up as the difference between deploying the legal right and
deploying the legal system. Some patent holders, both within
the Hatch-Waxman context and in other circumstances, are
taking advantage of weaknesses in the litigation system to
extract value that is unrelated to any value that the patents
might contribute to a product.5 It is a singularly unproductive
use of a government-granted right—a right that, ironically, is
intended to enhance productivity. As Rob Merges noted in a
recent article on litigation abuses in patent trolling: “As a way
of resolving disputes over the transfer of assets or legal rights,
litigation makes sense. As the basis of productive economic
activity, not so much.”6
A patent gives one an opportunity to exploit an idea. It is
not intended as a universal pass for exploiting the legal system.
Nevertheless, an inappropriate notion that I would call patent
exceptionalism has been allowing patent holders, all too
frequently, to exercise free rein. Patent exceptionalism, this
devotion to an artificial image of patents, is distorting the

and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 (2008)
(giving an overview of how the 2003 amendments modified the Act).
4. See, e.g., Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (“The patent world is quietly undergoing a change of
seismic proportions.”); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250 (2013) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Property
Wrongs]; Carl Shapiro & Fiona Scott Morton, Strategic Patent Acquisitions,
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288911 (describing the
increasing popularity of “strategic patent acquisitions”).
5. See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 4 (describing
inappropriate rent-seeking activity with intellectual property rights in
general); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 158–78 (2012)
[hereinafter FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW] (describing patent
manipulations in the pharmaceutical industry in both the Hatch-Waxman and
other contexts).
6. See Robert Merges, Some Common Sense About Innovation and Patent
Litigation, MEDIA INST. (July 22, 2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/
2013/072213.php.
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patent system, as well as the other legal domains with which it
must interact.
The patent system is not a deity to which we must
respectfully defer. It is a living, breathing part of the organism
that is our legal system. If we continue to treat patents with
exceptionalism, we have only ourselves to blame as we walk
willingly into the volcano.
Part I of this Article describes Hatch-Waxman and the
questions that arise in reverse payment settlements between
branded and generic pharmaceutical companies. Part II
describes patent exceptionalism and explains how the Supreme
Court decision in Actavis moves away from it. This part also
highlights where exceptionalism imagery continues to lurk
within some of the Justices’ language, both in the majority and
dissenting opinions.
Part III moves beyond patent exceptionalism and explains
how the appeal of patent execptionalism is intertwined with
problems in the antitrust system. To put it bluntly, patent
exceptionalism is alluring because it makes life so simple.
Moving away from patent exceptionalism means that we have
to worry about the messy question of what is acceptable and
what is not acceptable patent behavior.
In the antitrust arena, this question is generally addressed
through the rule of reason, and there is nothing messier than
the rule of reason—at least in its pure form. As I have noted in
the past, the rule of reason analysis is so complex that it is a
burden on litigants and the judicial system.7 Once again, the
Supreme Court language in Actavis opens the door for moving
away from this problem, although one could argue that the
door was opened merely a crack. Specifically, by directing the
lower courts to “structure” antitrust litigation,8 the Court
provided an opportunity to give form to the amorphous rule of
reason, an apparition that has repelled the hardiest of
antitrust warriors. Part III of this Article will discuss the
notion of a structured rule of reason and how it might give form
to the inquiry.

7. Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999) [hereinafter Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in
Antitrust] (citing various sources showing the difficulty of applying the rule of
reason).
8. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013).
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PAY-FOR-DELAY

A. HATCH-WAXMAN
Approved in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act (the Act) was
designed to reduce the price of medicines by bringing generic
drugs to market as quickly as possible.9 Studies show that the
price of medication drops by 20%–30% when one generic enters
the market and can fall as much as 80% or more when multiple
generics enter and saturate the market.10
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies could
not begin working on approval and production of a medicine
until the expiration of the branded drug’s patent.11 This
allowed continuation of the branded drug’s market power
beyond the life of the patent.12 Among other things, the Act
provided a mechanism for the generic drug maker to begin the
approval process ahead of time so that the generic drug would
be ready for launch at the expiration of the patent.13
The Act’s attempts to encourage generic entry go well
beyond lining up for entry. In particular, the Act allows generic
companies to piggy-back on the extensive studies required for
FDA approval of a drug.14 Rather than repeating the lengthy
and expensive drug trials required for a new drug, generic
companies can use the data from the original studies and focus
on demonstrating that the generic version has the same active
ingredients and is biologically equivalent to the original drug.15

9. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (stating the purpose of the Act was
to “make available more low cost generic drugs”).
10. See, e.g., Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1476 n.30 (2008);
Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and
Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 214 (2004); see also Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaims at 23, Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Sandoz
Inc., No. 2:08-CV-3710-PAC (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2008), 2008 WL 4486682;
Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331,
335–36 (1992).
11. See Avery, supra note 3, at 174–75.
12. Id. at 175.
13. Id. at 176.
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (providing for abbreviated new drug
applications (ANDAs)).
15. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)).
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The Act also includes an incentive for companies to step up
to the plate, bring forth generic versions, and challenge the
branded behemoths—and, in fact, there has been some
grumbling that Hatch-Waxman tilts too far in favor of generics
in various aspects. Specifically, the first generic to file for
approval under the Hatch-Waxman system and get the drug to
market will receive a six-month exclusivity period.16 In other
words, no other generic can come to market during that period.
This has the effect of ensuring that the price will stay higher
for the branded drug company and for the single generic during
this period than when all generics are eventually allowed in
after six months. The six-month exclusivity period can be worth
as much as hundreds of millions of dollars to a generic
company.17
The Hatch-Waxman Act also contains a procedure for
resolving potential patent disputes between the generic and the
branded drug companies. Among other options, a generic
company can assert that the patents covering the drug are
either invalid or do not apply to the generic version.18 The
branded drug company can then bring an infringement suit,
which stops the FDA approval process for thirty months while
the parties litigate.19
B. WHY PAY FOR DELAY?
The end of the life of a patent can be a traumatic time for
the maker of a blockbuster drug, and as with many end-of-life
decisions, it can produce a flurry of activity to extend the
company’s life blood—its prominence in the market—for as
long as possible. Pay-for-delay settlements are one of a variety
of approaches pharmaceutical companies have developed that
have the effect of delaying the inevitable and holding onto the
stream of supercharged prices a little longer.20

16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
17. Hemphill, supra note 3, at 1579.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Such challenges are referred to as
Paragraph IV challenges, “which occur when a generic manufacturer seeks
FDA approval to make a generic equivalent of a pioneer’s drug before its
patent term has expired.” Avery, supra note 3, at 177.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
20. For a description of other approaches, see FELDMAN, RETHINKING
PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 158–78.
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Imagine if a branded company pays the generic company to
stay off the market beyond the expiration of the patent term.
Given that Hatch-Waxman prevents additional generics from
coming to market until six months after the first generic gets to
market, whenever that may be, the agreement could have the
effect of keeping all generic companies off the market beyond
the expiration of the patent term. This arrangement could raise
concerns about anticompetitive behavior. The end of the patent
should bring competition and drive prices down, but the
branded company has delayed that day of reckoning. In essence
the branded company, knowing that prices will stay at a
supracompetitive level, may be sharing some of those monopoly
rents with the generic company, with the two agreeing to keep
competition out of the market. The loser, of course, would be
the consumer who continues to pay inappropriately high drug
prices—although increasingly, the losers are also the insurance
companies and government entities that pay those prices.
The settlement in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. is more subtle.
There, the branded company paid the generic, and the generic
agreed to drop its patent challenge but to stay off the market
only until a time before the expiration of the patent—sixty-five
months before the expiration of the patent.21 This brings the
issues into stark relief. On the one hand, the branded company
can argue that the settlement is a rational calculation of the
costs and risks of litigation that a company may incur even if
the patent is perfectly valid and validly applies to the generic
drug. On the other hand, one could argue that a reverse
payment of this kind is much like the classic reverse payment
settlement described above. Although the life of a patent that is
valid and validly applied may have been sixty-five months
more, the life of a patent that is invalid or invalidly applied is
zero. Thus, an Actavis-style settlement could be an
inappropriate use of a patent in an anticompetitive manner.
Overshadowing all of this, we have patent exceptionalism,
which has been applied to prevent the courts from even
considering these issues.
II. PATENT EXCEPTIONALISM
The clash between patent law and antitrust law is often
portrayed as a battle of the Titans, with antitrust law
21. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
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abhorring monopoly and patent law championing it. One
version of the narrative is something like the following: Patents
confer a monopoly; anticompetitive though this may be, it is the
life we have chosen for our patent system. Thus, when a patent
is at play, antitrust should yield, and the government should
keep its nose out. Following this line of reasoning, some courts
have been willing to say, as the Eleventh Circuit did in this
case, that given a patent holder’s lawful right to exclude others
from the market, a patent “conveys the right to cripple
competition.”22 The dissenters in Actavis articulated the issue
in simple, stark terms: “A patent carves out an exception to the
applicability of antitrust laws.”23 Or, as Chief Justice Roberts
noted: “[A] patent holder acting within the scope of its patent
has an obvious defense to any antitrust suit: that its patent
allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws . . . . [T]hat’s the whole point of a patent: to
confer a limited monopoly.”24
The problem with this approach is that it fails to
distinguish between deploying the right and deploying the
system. If a patent is valid and if it is being validly asserted
against an infringer, the patent holder may be deploying the
right. There is no guarantee, however, that those things are
true. If they are not, the patent holder may simply be using the
system to extract value or gain an advantage beyond the value
of the patent. If one shuts off any inquiry the moment a patent
appears, one loses the opportunity to ask whether the behavior
involves deploying the patent system, rather than deploying
the patent. This is a danger of patent exceptionalism.
The majority opinion recognized this when it noted the
following: “Solvay’s patent, if valid and infringed, might have
permitted it to charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the
reverse settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential
generic competitors . . . . But we do not agree that that fact, or
characterization, can immunize the agreement from antitrust
attack.”25

22. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013).
23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2240.
25. Id. at 2230 (majority opinion).
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To some extent, patent exceptionalism flows from a
distorted view of what a patent actually is. The notion of
exclusion in patent law is quite different from the notion of
exclusion in antitrust law, or in popular discourse.26 In
antitrust law, exclusion—as in exclusion of rivals—connotes an
image of occupying a competitive sphere to prevent the
incursion of rivals. The patent notion of exclusion is far more
subtle. Despite much sloppy language from courts and
commentators, a patent does not grant an exclusive right to
make, use, or sell a product.27 In fact, a patent does not grant
the right to do anything at all. A patent merely grants the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention,
but others may have overlapping rights to exclude.28 In other
words, all you get is the right to exclude others from standing
in the sphere of the invention—as long as they do not have
their own rights to be standing in that sphere as well.29
For example, suppose an inventor holds the patent on a
chemical for making a bright blue dye for candy. Having
identified a use for the chemical, and if the patent is drafted
broadly enough, the patent holder can obtain the right to
exclude anyone from using the dye for any purposes. Suppose,
however, a medical researcher discovers that the dye is also
useful for treating spinal cord injuries. The researcher can now
obtain a patent on the specific use of the dye for treating spinal
injury.30 At that point, the original inventor has the right to
exclude everyone from using the dye for any reason. In
addition, the medical researcher has the right to exclude
everyone from using the dye for the specific purpose of treating
injuries. Neither one can operate in the most valuable space—
curing spinal injuries, not selling candy—without obtaining a
license from the other. Their rights are overlapping, a reality
that is quite different from what most people imagine when
26. For an extensive discussion of the ways in which patent and antitrust
law use the same concepts and terminology with differing meaning and
contexts, see Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of
Meaning, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2008, at 1.
27. See, e.g., id. at 8 n.27, 9 n.36.
28. See id. at 8.
29. See id. at 8–9.
30. This hypothetical is based on an actual medical discovery. See
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The
hypothetical and the concepts are described further in FELDMAN, RETHINKING
PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 23–35.

2014]

ENDING PATENT EXCEPTIONALISM

69

they think of the patent system. The point is simply that a
patent does not necessarily grant an “exclusive” right at all.
The right to exclude is not the same thing as having an
exclusive right.
The difference is more than one of semantics. The patent
system contemplates far less power and control than many
people assume. Oblivious to this, courts treat patents as
exceptional creatures, endowing them with a power well
beyond what is contemplated by the patent system itself.
In a similar vein, some courts and commentators blithely
assume that a patent confers a monopoly. That is simply
untrue. A patent may give its holder the opportunity to try to
carve out space in the market or to find others interested in
licensing the patent to do so, but that pursuit rarely succeeds,
let alone leads to a monopoly.31 Historically, the vast majority
of patents never create any economic return at all.32
Translating a patented idea into an actual product usually
requires the use of multiple patented inventions,33 as well as
much that is not patented. In the pharmaceutical arena, one
must be able to translate the patent into a product that is
stable and can be mass-produced, as well as one that is
approved by the FDA. In addition, there may be other close
substitutes or sufficient cross-market elasticities. One might
hold the patent on aspirin, for example, but still have to
compete with those who make acetaminophen and ibuprofen.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that a patent does not
necessarily confer a monopoly.34
In short, a patent is a remarkably limited right, and its
limited nature reflects the policies inherent in the patent
system. Despite common misperceptions, the patent system is
not a monstrous beast, rapacious for the sacrifice of
competition.

31. See Feldman, supra note 26, at 4.
32. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J.
ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 (2005).
33. See id. at 81–82 (“In a number of key industries, . . . companies file
numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into
a single functional product.” (internal citations omitted)).
34. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–56 (2006)
(holding that a patent by itself is not sufficient to create a presumption of
market power for the purposes of a tying claim).
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Even the majority opinion in Actavis subtly falls prey to an
image of the patent system as single-mindedly anticompetitive.
For example, the Court notes that “[i]t would be incongruous to
determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy.”35
Similarly, at another point the Court describes precedential
cases that “seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies,
finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent
law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring
competition.”36 Along the same lines, the dissenting opinion is
strongly out of focus when it notes that “the whole point of a
patent [is] to confer a limited monopoly.”37 In contrast to these
declarations, however, the conflict between patent policy and
antitrust policy is less stark when one recognizes that the
patent system contemplates a far weaker and more limited
vehicle than the sleek, anticompetitive racehorse most people
have in mind.
The danger of treating patents as exceptional creatures, for
which all antitrust inquiry must yield, becomes even greater in
the context of sham litigation. Current doctrines hamper a
court’s ability to respond to sham litigation brought by patent
holders. The problems can be traced to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that if citizens
have the right to petition their government, they should be able
to do so without fear of antitrust liability, even if the results of
that petition would harm their competitors.38 The original
doctrine developed to protect citizens who petition legislators to
enact a law or regulators to enforce a law, but it has been
expanded to protect citizens who petition the courts by filing a
lawsuit.39 There is, however, a critical exception. Parties who
file sham litigation may still be liable for antitrust violations.40

35. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
36. Id. at 2233.
37. Id. at 2240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal punctuation omitted).
38. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961)) (“Those who petition government for redress are
generally immune from antitrust liability.”).
39. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
40. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
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Under current doctrine, the standards for showing sham
litigation are extraordinarily difficult to meet in the case of a
patent lawsuit. In order to establish that a lawsuit is a sham,
one must show that the suit is both objectively and subjectively
baseless.41 With the vast uncertainty involved in interpreting
the language of any patent, it is remarkably difficult to show
that any patent lawsuit is both objectively and subjectively
baseless.42 One can always make an argument in patent law
that one had some reason to believe someone might construe
language somewhere in some claim in a way that is favorable.
Thus, even if a patent holder’s argument is tremendously weak,
courts are reluctant to find that it constitutes a sham.43
Worse yet, some courts have suggested that the burden for
proving sham litigation should be even higher in cases that
involve patents than in other cases, on the grounds that
patents are presumptively valid.44 This is a remarkable
misinterpretation of patent law. It is true that a patent carries
a presumption of validity, but that has nothing to do with
whether the assertion of the patent against a particular target
is valid. The fact that a patent is presumed valid does not
answer the question of whether the use of that patent is valid
from an antitrust perspective.

41. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57 (“We now . . . hold that
an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of
subjective intent.”). For a discussion of the history and requirements of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in relation to Hatch-Waxman litigation, see
FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 164–70; see also
Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen
Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (2013) (proposing changes to
FDA regulations and judicial doctrines to avoid problems caused by sham
petitions).
42. FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 5, at 168 (“Proving
sham litigation, however, requires satisfaction of a remarkably high
burden . . . .”).
43. For a troubling example of how difficult this standard is to meet, see
Robin Feldman, Public Comment on Intellectual Property Assertion &
Monetization, FTC Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop (Mar. 27,
2013), at 48–56, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/pae/pae-0034.pdf
(describing the j2 Global patent assertion campaign).
44. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1985), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations,
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 601 F.2d
986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp.,
343 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2004).
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All of these issues must be understood in the context of
Hatch-Waxman. A significant corner of the Hatch-Waxman
system is litigation-based. If we combine the complexities of
Hatch-Waxman (including its potential for manipulation) with
the rigidity of the sham litigation rules and add in patent
exceptionalism, we risk granting companies a free pass for
anticompetitive behavior. The key to disrupting this unholy
trinity lies in acknowledging the difference between the
legitimate use of the patent right and the illegitimate use of the
patent system.
III. STRUCTURING THE RULE OF REASON
Patent exceptionalism is a particularly appealing myth
when faced with the specter of a messy antitrust inquiry. And
in the world of antitrust, nothing is messier than the rule of
reason in all its full glory.
The rule of reason traditionally has been an amorphous
and undisciplined inquiry. It is described in full in Justice
Brandeis’ formulation from almost a hundred years ago:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.45

With its extensive requirements for economic proof and its
open-ended nature, the rule of reason is not for the faint of
heart, nor for ordinary mortals who lack deep pockets. In fact,
the rule of reason has been described by courts and
commentators as complex and burdensome on litigants and on
the judicial system.46 Moreover, a plaintiff abandoned to the
mercy of the rule of reason will almost certainly lose.47
45. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
46. See, e.g., Cont’l T. V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16
(1977) (noting that per se rules are used to avoid the complexity of rule-ofreason trials); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972)
(noting that the “inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in
another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules”); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (expressing frustration that
the rule of reason inquiry is “often wholly fruitless when undertaken”);
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In a 1999 article entitled Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust,
I suggested the development of a “structured rule of reason.”48
Since then, the notion of a structured rule of reason has
appeared in scattered academic commentary and occasional
court opinions.49
In particular, the Supreme Court hinted at the idea of
structuring the rule of reason in the 2007 Leegin case.50 In
Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, supra note 7, at 2106–12
(contrasting the rule of reason with per se and other intermediary inquiries
and describing the burdensome nature of the rule of reason); Nicole McGuire,
An Antitrust Narcotic: How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical Enforcement
to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1247–51 (2012) (noting criticisms of the
rule of reason in the context of evaluating vertical restraints); Maurice E.
Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1490 (2009) (noting that the rule of reason is expensive and its
outcomes unpredictable and that it is deficient under rule of law principles of
nonarbitrariness, and general applicability); see also Robert Pitofsky,
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Leegin, the Court abandoned per se treatment for vertical price
restraints, but offered a glimmer of potential for a more
workable rule of reason with the following language: “As courts
gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by
applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they
can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule
operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the
market and to provide more guidance to businesses.”51
In Actavis, once again, the Court has signaled its interest
by noting, somewhat enigmatically, that structuring could be
developed for the rule of reason.52 In typical fashion, however,
the Court did not specify how the rule of reason inquiry might
be structured, leaving it to the lower courts to develop, test,
and sort out approaches.
As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust
litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust
theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the
other, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of
the minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the
presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We
therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present
rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.53

Any structuring, of course, will have to steer clear of the
so-called “quick look” test, relief that the government prayed
for in this case but was denied by the Court.54 As described by
the Court, the quick look test would have shifted the burden to
the defense to show pro-competitive effects in the event of
reverse payments of the type described in the case.55 Despite
the government’s plea, the Court soundly rejected that option,
and courts and commentators would be wise to avoid
structuring that appears to resurrect the quick look test.56
One model for a potential structuring of the rule of reason
can be found in the seminal antitrust treatise by Professor
Hovenkamp.57 In the context of resale price maintenance,
Professor Hovenkamp suggests structuring the rule of reason
inquiry by allowing plaintiffs to establish their case through
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 898.
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2237.
Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999)).
Id.
See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, §1633.
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proving one of a series of factors dealing with market
concentration, how widespread the restraints are in the
industry, market power, geographic area, or need for
promotional efforts.58
Resale price maintenance concerns agreements between
manufacturers and distributers regarding constraints on the
price at which the product must be sold to the distributer’s
customers. The factors appropriate for a resale price
maintenance inquiry would not be appropriate for the complex,
patent-laden inquiry necessary to evaluate a Hatch-Waxman
settlement. The general approach is instructive, nevertheless.
By identifying factors that plaintiffs could choose among to
establish anticompetitive behavior and ones that defendants
could choose among to show procompetitive effects for
particular kinds of cases, one could develop a rational process
for identifying and curbing anticompetitive behavior—not to
mention signaling companies about where the line falls. In fact,
a good place to begin could be the Supreme Court opinion in
Actavis itself. There, the Court identified five sets of important
considerations, including the following: 1) the restraint has the
potential for genuine adverse effects; 2) the anticompetitive
consequences will sometimes prove unjustified; 3) the patent
holder likely has the power to bring about that harm in
practice; 4) an antitrust action is feasible administratively; and
5) other settlement options are available.59 Although the
considerations were designed to explain why the FTC should be
given the opportunity to present its antitrust case, rather than
proving the antitrust case itself, and corresponding categories
of proof to support even those considerations would have to be
developed, the five considerations could offer a clue to the type
of structured inquiry the Court would find acceptable in a rule
of reason inquiry for reverse payment settlements.
In short, the current all-or-nothing approach—per se you
are dead, rule of reason you go free—is less than satisfying
from either an intellectual or an operational perspective. Most
important, none of this activity—neither the Federal Trade
Commission’s effort in bringing the Actavis case nor the
Supreme Court’s effort in opening the door to examining
reverse payments—is worth a candle unless the courts actually

58. Id. §1633, at 385–86.
59. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (2013).
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develop a model for a successful demonstration under the rule
of reason.
Although the Court has opened the door ever so slightly,
one should not lose sight of the opportunity offered. It will
become increasingly important to flesh out the rule of reason as
competition authorities look more closely at behavior involving
patents. Whether that behavior is in the context of HatchWaxman litigation, patent trolling, or other circumstances, we
must be able to separate use of the intellectual property right
from use of the intellectual property system—as well as to
identify when the intellectual property system is being used in
an anticompetitive manner.
Most important, society cannot simply turn away
whenever the word “patent” is uttered. Such patent
exceptionalism flows from misconceptions about both the
patent system itself and the policy implications embedded in its
design. This misguided homage to a deity that does not exist
undermines the functioning of both the patent system and
antitrust law.

